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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
         Koppers Company, Inc. ("Koppers"), asserts breach of 
contract and declaratory judgment claims against its liability 
insurers, based on their denial of coverage for various 
environmental property damage claims.  Koppers entered into 
settlement agreements with several of its insurers prior to 
trial, leaving only certain excess liability insurers as 
litigating defendants.  Following the jury's determinations that 
the occurrence-based policies had been triggered and that Koppers 
had incurred a total of about $70 million in property damage 
liability, the district court entered judgment for Koppers,  
holding its excess insurers liable for the full amount of the 
claim without reducing the verdict to account for Koppers' 
settlements with the other insurers.   
         On appeal, the excess insurers allege four errors under 
Pennsylvania law: (1) the court erroneously instructed the jury 
that the occurrence-based policies would be triggered if any 
property damage occurred during the policy period, even if the 
initial cause of that damage was an event (such as a chemical 
spill) that occurred prior to the policy period; (2) the court 
erroneously instructed the jury that the insurer has the burden 
of proving that the specific property damage that occurred was 
not fortuitous but was expected or intended by the insured; (3) 
the court abused its discretion by excluding proffered evidence 
of Koppers' failure to mitigate the damage; and (4) the court 
erroneously failed to reduce the judgment to account for the 
plaintiff's settlements with other insurers.  We believe the 
district court committed reversible error with respect only to 
the last claim, and we will accordingly reverse and remand with 
instructions to reduce the judgment to account for the settling 
insurers' apportioned shares. 
 
                                I. 
         Koppers is a large, diverse manufacturing company based 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania that has been conducting 
manufacturing operations in locations throughout the United 
States since the early part of this century.  In the 1980s, 
federal and state agencies brought claims against Koppers 
demanding remediation for environmental contamination at some 150 
plant sites and disposal sites.  This environmental contamination 
included property damage to third-party soil, subsoil and 
groundwater.  Koppers then sought a defense and indemnification 
from its various liability insurers, all of whom initially denied 
coverage. 
           Appellants, defendants below, are a group of certain 
underwriters for Lloyd's of London and certain London market 
insurance companies (hereinafter the "London Insurers").  Over 
the years, the London Insurers have issued a number of excess 
liability insurance policies to Koppers. 
         Koppers commenced this action in 1985 against two of 
its primary insurers, and has since amended its complaint several 
times to add other primary and excess insurers, including the 
appellant insurers.  All of the defendant insurers except for the 
London Insurers settled with Koppers before trial.  Koppers, 
alleging that the London Insurers breached their contracts of 
insurance, sought damages and a declaratory judgment regarding 
Koppers' right to indemnification under those policies.   
         The district court limited the scope of the trial to 
twelve specific policies, which provided multiple layers of 
occurrence-based, excess liability coverage for third-party 
property damage.  Five of these policies were in effect between 
late 1953 and January 1957, and the remaining seven policies were 
in effect between January 1957 and January 1960.  Thus, although 
Koppers had insurance from at least the 1940s through at least 
the 1970s, the trial was limited to a roughly six-year period.  
The district court further limited the scope of the trial to only 
18 of the contaminated sites.  Finally, the trial was limited to 
determining liability and damages for cleanup and response costs 
incurred at these sites through the end of 1993, and to 
determining whether Koppers was entitled to a declaratory 
judgment for the period thereafter. 
         After a three-week trial, the jury found by special 
verdict that, during the applicable policy periods, (1) an 
"occurrence" had triggered coverage under all of the policies at 
issue at each site, and (2) Koppers had neither expected nor 
intended to cause damage to third-party property at any site.  
The jury awarded some $70 million in damages, and the court 
entered judgment in May 1995.  Pursuant to the court's 
instructions, the jury's damages figure represents the total 
costs Koppers had incurred because of third-party property damage 
at the eighteen focus sites through the end of 1993, without 
regard to the sums of money Koppers received from the settling 
insurers.  The court explained to the jury that the court would 
adjust the damages award according to rules of law after the jury 
determined the total damages figure. 
         Both parties moved to alter or amend the judgment under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  The district court, in its July 1995 
order, granted Koppers' motion and granted the London Insurers' 
motion in part but denied it in part.  Specifically, as relevant 
here, the court: (1) granted Koppers' motion to reduce the 
judgment to about $66 million, but denied the London Insurers' 
motion to reduce the judgment further to account for Koppers' 
settlements with the other insurers; (2) granted a declaratory 
judgment (limited to the twelve policies and eighteen focus sites 
at issue) that Koppers is entitled to indemnification under the 
London Insurers' policies for the period following 1993; and 
(3) certified the July 1995 order as final under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 54(b).  This timely appeal followed. 
 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
         The parties agree, as do we, that Pennsylvania law 
governs this case.  We review the district court's interpretation 
and prediction of state law de novo.  Wiley v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993).  In adjudicating a 
case under state law, we are not free to impose our own view of 
what state law should be; rather, we are to apply existing state 
case law as interpreted by the state's highest court in an effort 
to predict how that court would decide the precise legal issues 
before us.  Kowalsky v. Long Beach Township, 72 F.3d 385, 388 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  In the absence of guidance from the state's highest 
court, we must look to decisions of state intermediate appellate 
courts, of federal courts interpreting that state's law, and of 
other state supreme courts that have addressed the issue.  Wiley, 
995 F.2d at 459-60.  We must also consider "analogous decisions, 
considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data 
tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand."  McGowan v. University of 
Scranton, 759 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting McKenna v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
         A timely appeal from the denial of a Rule 59 motion to 
alter or amend the judgment brings up the underlying judgment for 
review, so that our standard of review varies with the underlying 
judicial decision.  Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 
345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986).   
         We exercise plenary review in determining whether a 
jury instruction misstates a legal standard.  Savarese v. Agriss, 
883 F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989).  We consider the jury 
instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and 
adequately contain the law applicable to the case.  See Douglas 
v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1995); Savarese, 883 F.2d 
at 1202. 
         "We review pre-trial and trial court rulings concerning 
the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion," but "error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected."  
Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "[I]f we find non- 
constitutional error in a civil suit, such error is harmless only 
if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the 
outcome of the case."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
                               III. 
                                A. 
         We will address first the London Insurers' argument 
that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions 
regarding the trigger of coverage under their policies.  The 
district court instructed the jury that the policies could be 
triggered in either of two ways: 
         These policies are triggered if either, one, the cause 
         of the property damage or, two, the property damage 
         itself took place during the policy period for each 
         site.  Thus, if an event or events that eventually led 
         to property damage took place during the policy period, 
         or if . . . the property damage itself took place 
         during the policy period, the policies have been 
         triggered. 
App. at 2046.  The London Insurers argue, however, that their 
policies could be triggered only by a causative event taking 
place during the policy period, not by the resulting property 
damage alone if the causative event occurred pre-policy. 
         We need not predict how the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would interpret these particular insurance 
contracts, however.  Koppers introduced uncontroverted evidence 
that the property damage (mostly groundwater contamination 
through leaching) was continuous, progressive, and indivisible 
throughout the relevant policy periods.  It also introduced 
uncontroverted evidence that the causes of the contamination 
(e.g., leaks, drips, spills, or disposals) existed at each site 
during each policy period.  Based on this evidence, the jury 
found that each of the policies had been triggered.  While such a 
finding could theoretically have been made under the court's 
instruction based solely on the jury's acceptance of Koppers' 
uncontradicted evidence regarding the occurrence of property 
damage, we perceive no basis on which the jury might have 
accepted that evidence yet rejected Koppers' uncontroverted 
evidence regarding the occurrence of the causes of that damage.  
Accordingly, we find it more than highly probable that the 
district court's charge on this point did not affect the outcome 
of the case.  In short, the charge, even if erroneous, was 
harmless error. 
 
                                B. 
                                1. 
         The London Insurers next argue that the court erred in 
instructing the jury that the insurers had the burden of proving, 
as an affirmative defense, that the losses were not fortuitous-- 
i.e., that Koppers expected or intended the third-party property 
damage.  The London Insurers argue that, because a plaintiff 
insured must prove that it is entitled to coverage, and because 
only fortuitous losses are covered, Koppers had the burden of 
proving that it neither expected nor intended the harm. 
         The question of which party bears the burden of proof 
in a diversity case is a matter of state substantive law.  Blair 
v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 1982).  In 
Pennsylvania, the insured bears the burden of proving facts that 
bring its claim within the policy's affirmative grant of 
coverage.  See, e.g., Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 
23 (3d Cir. 1985).  By contrast, the insurer bears the burden of 
proving the applicability of any exclusions or limitations on 
coverage, since disclaiming coverage on the basis of an exclusion 
is an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. 
Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1994); Compagnie des 
Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 551 F. Supp. 1239, 
1243 (W.D. Pa. 1982).  Our research has revealed no Pennsylvania 
case allocating the burden of proof on the fortuity requirement.  
We nonetheless predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
place the burden on the insurer in this case. 
         The terms of the policies do not mention fortuity.  The 
portions of the policies defining the scope of coverage state 
that the London Insurers will "indemnify the Assured for all sums 
which the Assured shall be obligated to pay by reason of the 
liability imposed upon the Assured . . . for damages . . . on 
account of . . . property damage."  App. at 141.  There is no 
requirement in the coverage provisions that the loss be 
fortuitous or "unexpected and unintended."  Nor do the exclusion 
provisions of any of the policies expressly exclude losses that 
are non-fortuitous or "expected and intended." 
         In Intermetal Mexicana v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 866 
F.2d 71, 72 (3d Cir. 1989), the insurance policy at issue covered 
"'all risks of direct physical loss or damage from any external 
cause except hereinafter excluded.'"  The insurer acknowledged 
that the loss claimed was within the scope of coverage as so 
stated but denied coverage because that loss was not fortuitous.  
The policy exclusions contained no reference to the fortuity of 
the loss.  This court there predicted that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would recognize a "judicially created 'fortuity' 
exclusion from coverage."  Id. at 76.  Our prediction was based 
on the generally accepted principle that "every 'all risk' 
contract of insurance contains an unnamed exclusion -- the loss 
must be fortuitous in nature."  Id. at 75.  We recognized that 
this generally recognized principle had a "public policy" basis.  
Id. at 77. 
         The rationale supporting the generally accepted rule 
against indemnity for non-fortuitous losses is succinctly 
explained in Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law  
§ 5.3(a), at 476-77 (student ed. 1988): 
              [The concept of fortuity], which 
         expresses the concern that insurance 
         arrangements should be limited to the 
         transfer of economic detriments that are 
         fortuitous, is generally regarded as a 
         principle that is central to the basic 
         determination of what risks may or should be 
         transferred by an insurance arrangement.  In 
         most circumstances, it is contrary to public 
         policy to permit the enforcement of an 
         insurance contract if it would provide 
         indemnification for losses that are not 
         fortuitous. . . . 
 
         . . . The [rule requiring fortuity] embodies 
         a fundamental and significant public policy 
         interest that in some contexts is 
         sufficiently important to preclude coverage 
         claims even when there are explicit 
         agreements to the contrary, but in any case 
         is a very compelling public interest in 
         regard to coverage questions when there is no 
         applicable provision in the insurance 
         agreement. 
         Consistent with Intermetal Mexicana, we predict that it 
is the public policy of Pennsylvania not to enforce an insurance 
coverage contract providing coverage for a non-fortuitous loss.  
As with exclusions stated in an insurance policy itself, when an 
insurer relies on public policy to deny coverage of a claim, the 
insurer must bear the burden.  See, e.g., Butterfield v. 
Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646, 654 (Pa. Super. 1995) (finding no 
exclusion for punitive damages in insurance policy, burden 
shifted to insurer to prove that punitive damages are excluded as 
against public policy in Pennsylvania); Princeton Ins. Co. v. 
Chunmuang, 678 A.2d 1143, 1147 (N.J. Super. 1996) ("Whether the 
exclusion is based on an expressed provision or on the public 
policy prohibition of insurance against criminal conduct, the 
insurer bears a substantial burden of demonstrating that the loss 
falls outside the scope of coverage."); Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 762 F.Supp. 1368, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1991), appeal 
dismissed and remanded, 4 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 1993) (burden on 
insurer to prove damages at issue fall within California public 
policy exclusion).  In particular, if an insurer has issued a 
policy that on its face covers the loss at issue and seeks to 
deny coverage on the basis that enforcing the policy as written 
would offend the public policy against indemnification of non- 
fortuitous losses, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would place on the insurer the burden of proving that the 
circumstances of the loss were such that coverage would be 
inconsistent with that public policy.  We therefore conclude that 
the district court did not erroneously allocate the burden of 
proof as to whether Koppers' losses were expected and intended. 
 
 
                                2. 
         In addition to challenging the district court's 
fortuity instruction for misallocating the burden of proof, the 
London Insurers argue that the instruction improperly limited 
this public policy affirmative defense to situations in which the 
insured "expected or intended" the specific harms that occurred.  
They insist that, under Pennsylvania law, coverage is defeated if 
the insured expected or intended a harm of the same general typeas the 
harm that occurred.  Koppers does not contest this 
proposition; it does dispute, however, that the court's 
instructions were inconsistent with this proposition. 
         We agree that the district court's instructions on this 
issue did not limit the fortuity defense to those harms 
specifically expected or intended by the insured.  As the London 
Insurers point out, the district court instructed the jury: "If 
you find that Koppers intentionally or knowingly caused property 
damage for which it seeks coverage, then Koppers may not recover 
for that specific damage."  App. at 1013.   However, the court 
concluded this instruction by stating: "To lose coverage, Koppers 
must have intended the same general type of property damage that 
occurred."  Id.  We think that the instructions on this point, 
when read as a whole, fairly conveyed to the jury what the 
parties agree is the correct legal standard.  See Douglas v. 
Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1995); Savarese v. Agriss, 883 
F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 
                                C. 
         The London Insurers' third claim is that the district 
court abused its discretion by excluding their proffered evidence 
of Koppers' failure to mitigate the property damage.  The 
insurers argue that, under Pennsylvania law, an insured has an 
ongoing duty to mitigate its losses, and that Koppers' recovery 
must be reduced by the amount of loss which could have been 
prevented if Koppers had undertaken reasonable efforts to 
mitigate the property damage. 
         The district court ruled, as a general matter, that 
evidence of Koppers' failure to mitigate damages would be 
admissible.  Although the precise basis for the district court's 
decision to exclude the London Insurers' proffered evidence is 
not clear from the record, we find no reversible error. 
         As a matter of general contract law, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's duty to mitigate its 
damages arises upon the defendant's breach of the contract.  
E.g., Bafile v. Borough of Muncy, 588 A.2d 462, 464 (Pa. 1991).  
The superior court has applied this rule in the context of an 
insurance contract, holding that, upon the insurer's breach by 
refusing to indemnify the insured, the insured has a duty to 
mitigate its damages.  See Forest City Grant Liberty Assocs. v. 
Genro II, Inc., 652 A.2d 948, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding 
that insurer, once found to be liable, need not reimburse  
insured for unnecessary roof repairs).  Here, the defendant 
insurers breached by refusing to indemnify Koppers in the 1980s, 
but all of the proffered "mitigation" evidence concerned the 
prior two decades.  Even assuming, however, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would require an insured to mitigate its damages 
prior to the insurer's breach of contract, the district court's 
exclusion of the proffered evidence was proper because the 
evidence was legally insufficient to make out a claim of failure 
to mitigate damages. 
         Mitigation is an affirmative defense, so the burden of 
proving a failure to mitigate is on the defendant.  See Williams 
v. Masters, Mates and Pilots of Am., 120 A.2d 896, 901 (Pa. 
1956); Ecksel v. Orleans Constr. Co., 519 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Pa. 
Super. 1987).  To prove a failure to mitigate, a defendant must 
show: (1) what reasonable actions the plaintiff ought to have 
taken, (2) that those actions would have reduced the damages, and 
(3) the amount by which the damages would have been reduced.  
See, e.g., Ecksel, 519 A.2d at 1021 (finding defendant's failure 
to mitigate defense unproven because defendant did not show how 
plaintiff could have mitigated damages or how damages were made 
worse by alleged inaction); State Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth. v. W.M. 
Anderson Co., 410 A.2d 1329 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (affirming 
judgment for contractor where breaching school district failed to 
show that contractor's work was unreasonable and avoidable); see 
also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. 
Supp. 1321, 1332 (D. Del. 1988) (holding that, where insurance 
policy contained express mitigation provision, insurer must 
specify what further injury occurred as result of the insured's 
lack of mitigation). 
         The London Insurers' evidence would not have satisfied 
any of these three elements, as it merely purports to show that 
Koppers was aware of property damage in the 1960s and 1970s but 
failed to correct the problem until the 1980s.  The London 
Insurers offered no evidence of what reasonable actions Koppers 
might or ought to have taken, no evidence tending to show that 
any actions would have measurably reduced the harm, and, thus, no 
evidence from which the jury could have determined how much 
damages could have been reduced by mitigation.  For this reason, 
the court's exclusion of the London Insurers' evidence was not 
reversible error.   
 
                                D. 
         The London Insurers' final claim is that the district 
court erroneously saddled them with liability for the entire loss 
by improperly failing to reduce the judgment to account for 
Koppers' settlements with the other defendant insurers.  We 
agree. 
 
                                1. 
         In J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
called upon to allocate coverage responsibility among six primary 
insurers, each of which was obligated to cover an indivisible 
loss.  J.H. France had brought a declaratory judgment action to 
determine its insurers' duty to defend and indemnify against 
lawsuits involving asbestos-related bodily injury claims.  The 
insurance policies at issue were all pre-1986 comprehensive 
general liability ("CGL") policies which would be triggered by 
the occurrence during the policy period of "bodily injury."  
Affirming the lower court's application of the "multiple-trigger" 
or "continuous-trigger" theory of determining liability of the 
insurers, under which all phases of the disease--exposure, 
progression, and manifestation--independently constitute "bodily 
injury" triggering coverage, the supreme court held that "every 
insurer which was on the risk at any time during the development 
of a claimant's asbestos-related disease has an obligation to 
indemnify J.H. France."  Id. at 507. 
         The next question, naturally, was "how to allocate the 
liability of each insurer when, as is commonly the case, more 
than one insurer was on the risk at one time or another during 
the development of a claimant's disease."  Id.  The superior 
court had held that the several insurers must share the 
obligation to indemnify on a pro rata basis, apportioned upon the 
amount of time each policy was in effect.  Id.  Declining to 
adopt that approach, the supreme court held instead that the 
insurers whose coverage had been triggered were jointly and 
severally liable for the full amount of the claim up to policy 
limits, and that the insured was entitled to select the policy or 
policies under which it would be indemnified.  Id. at 508.  As 
the supreme court explained: 
         When the policy limits of a given insurer are 
         exhausted, J.H. France is entitled to seek 
         indemnification from any of the remaining insurers 
         which was on the risk during the development of the 
         disease [i.e., the remaining triggered policies].  Any 
         policy in effect during the period from exposure 
         through manifestation must indemnify the insured until 
         its coverage is exhausted. 
Id. at 509.  The supreme court added, however, that its holding 
"does not alter the rules of contribution or the provisions of 
'other insurance' clauses in the applicable policies," so that an 
insurer who is saddled with more than its fair share of liability 
may seek to obtain "a share of indemnification or defense costs 
from other insurers."  Id. 
         In the instant case, the district court predicted that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would extend its holding on the 
allocation issue in J.H. France to cases involving environmental 
property damage claims, such that all insurers whose policies 
were triggered to cover an indivisible loss would be jointly and 
severally liable, up to policy limits, for the full amount of 
that loss.  Although we conclude that J.H. France does not 
completely control the disposition of this case, we agree as a 
general matter with this prediction. 
         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reasons for adopting 
the joint and several approach in J.H. France are fully 
applicable to the case before us.  "First, and most compelling, 
is the language of the policies themselves."  Id. at 507.  In 
J.H. France, "[e]ach insurer obligated itself to 'pay on behalf 
of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which 
this insurance applies.'"  Id. (emphasis in original).  Thus, as 
the supreme court explained, "each insurer contracted to pay all 
sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay, not 
merely some pro rata portion thereof."  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
         Similarly, the policy at issue here obligated the 
London Insurers "to indemnify the Assured for all sums which the 
Assured shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability 
imposed upon the Assured . . . for damages . . . on account of . 
. . property damage."  App. at 141 (emphasis added).  We 
accordingly believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
interpret the London Insurers' policies here, as it did the 
policies at issue in J.H. France, to "cover [the insured's] 
entire liability once they are triggered."  626 A.2d at 508 
(quoting Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 
1048 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982)) 
(alteration in original omitted); see ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir. 1985) (predicting 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret "the phrase 'all sums' 
to provide for full coverage once coverage under a policy was 
triggered"). 
         The second reason the supreme court gave for adopting 
the joint and several approach in J.H. France is the 
indivisibility of asbestos-related bodily injury.  No medical 
evidence was presented to substantiate the assumption, implicit 
in the superior court's allocation method of pro rata by time on 
the risk, "that the progression of asbestos-related disease is 
linear in character."  626 A.2d at 508.  The supreme court 
elaborated: "To apportion liability among the insurers on a 
strictly temporal basis in direct proportion to the length of 
time each insurer was on the risk, . . . notwithstanding its 
surface attractiveness, assumes a linearity of disease 
progression which this record does not support."  Id.  
         As with asbestos-related bodily injury, environmental 
property damage is a progressive harm that, as a practical 
matter, is indivisible.  See, e.g., New Castle County v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 811-12 (D. Del. 1989) 
(concluding "it would be impossible in this case to determine 
when the first molecule of contaminant damaged neighboring 
property, or at what rate the contamination spread"), aff'd and 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Abraham, supra, at 120 ("Given the progressive nature of the 
environmental harms in question, finding the facts necessary [to 
hold each policy liable only for those harms that occurred during 
the policy period] usually would be administratively difficult, 
scientifically impossible, or both."); John H. Mathias, Jr. et 
al., Allocation: J.H. France and the Insureds' Right to Select 
from Multiple-Triggered Policies, Coverage (A.B.A. Sec. Litig.), 
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 19-20 ("Like the progression of asbestosis or 
other insidious diseases, the migrations of contaminants over 
years or decades may result not from a predictable, linear 
process, but rather from sporadic or periodic events or 
conditions that vary in magnitude and frequency over the 
years.").  Accordingly, it is appropriate to hold the triggered 
policies jointly and severally liable here, given that "because 
each has been triggered to provide coverage against liability for 
a single indivisible injury, there is no basis for apportioning 
responsibility among them."  Abraham, supra, at 120-21. 
         Finally, the supreme court in J.H. France relied on the 
fact that, according to the policies' terms, each of the several 
policies triggered to cover a specific claim was potentially 
liable for the entire claim.  The policies provided insurance 
against "occurrences" and, as defined in the policies, an 
"occurrence" included "'continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions which result in bodily injury.'"  626 A.2d at 508.  
Thus, the entire "process of exposure [would] constitute one 
occurrence."  Id.  The supreme court explained: 
         Being defined as one "occurrence," the entire injury, 
         and all damages resulting therefrom, fall within the 
         indemnification obligation of the insurer.  In other 
         words, once the liability of a given insurer is 
         triggered, it is irrelevant that additional exposure or 
         injury occurred at times other than when the insurer 
         was on the risk.  The insurer in question must bear 
         potential liability for the entire claim.  
Id.; see also ACandS, 764 F.2d at 974 (noting that, "if a 
plaintiff's damages are caused in part during an insured period, 
it is irrelevant to [the insured's] legal obligations and, 
therefore, to the insurer's liability that they were also caused, 
in part, during another period"). 
         Like the CGL policies in J.H. France, the London 
Insurers' policies provided occurrence-based coverage and 
defined an "occurrence" to mean either "a series of occurrences 
arising out of one event," App. at 158, or "one happening or 
series of happenings, arising out of or due to one event taking 
place during the term of this policy."  App. at 149.  Under 
either definition, then, all of the effects resulting from a 
single causative event are considered a single occurrence.  As in 
J.H. France, because the entire injury is defined as one 
"occurrence," a triggered policy must indemnify the insured for 
all damages resulting from that injury. 
         For these reasons, we predict that if the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court were faced with this case it would apply the J.H. 
France allocation approach, holding jointly and severally liable 
all policies triggered to cover a single, indivisible loss.  We 
note that other courts have similarly taken the joint and several 
approach where multiple policies cover an indivisible loss.  See, 
e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 
1047-50 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); 
Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 
1403, 1410-11 (E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.W.R. Grace 
& Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
 
                                2. 
         Given this prediction, if this case, like J.H. France, 
involved several triggered primary policies where none of the 
insurers had settled, J.H. France would dictate our resolution of 
this appeal.  But this is not such a case.  We must consider 
several complicating factors that were not present in J.H. 
France, namely, the presence of excess insurers, the insured's 
settlements with some primary and some excess insurers, and the 
district court's decision to limit the trial to a certain period 
of years at certain sites.  We believe that, if presented with 
the complicating factors in our case, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not simply apply J.H. France and hold that the 
appellant excess insurers are jointly and severally liable, up to 
policy limits, for the entire property damage liability at the 
focus sites.  Instead, as explained below, we predict that the 
supreme court would modify the J.H. France rule to hold the 
London Insurers jointly and severally liable for the amount of 
the loss in excess of the settling insurers' pro rata shares of 
liability. 
         We begin with the principle of indemnity, a fundamental 
principle of insurance law which prohibits insurance contracts 
from conferring a benefit greater than the insured's loss (i.e., 
a "double recovery").  See, e.g., J.H. France, 626 A.2d at 508 
(stating principle that insured "cannot collect more than it owes 
in damages") (quoting Keene, 667 F.2d at 1050); Keeton & Widiss, 
supra § 3.1(a), at 135.  We must apply this principle of 
indemnity -- barring recoveries greater than losses -- in 
conjunction with the J.H. France rule -- holding that where 
multiple insurance policies are triggered to cover an indivisible 
loss, each insurer may be called upon to cover the entire loss up 
to policy limits.  J.H. France does not, of course, hold that an 
insured, having recovered part of its loss from one insurer, can 
recover an amount equal to its entire loss from another. 
         Because we cannot permit a double recovery, and because 
several insurers have already paid money to Koppers in complete 
settlement of Koppers' claims against them, we must either 
(1) reduce the judgment to account for the settling insurers' 
apportioned shares of liability, or (2) permit the non-settling 
insurers to seek contribution from the settling insurers and, in 
turn, permit the settling insurers to seek reimbursement from 
Koppers.  We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
choose the former rule:  reducing the judgment to account for the 
settling insurers' apportioned shares of liability.  That is, we 
predict that the supreme court would adopt the "apportioned share 
set-off rule."   
         Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had 
occasion to decide how to allocate coverage responsibility where 
some of the defendant insurers have settled, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court has reached this issue and has resolved it by 
applying the apportioned share set-off rule.  In Gould, Inc. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 585 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), Gould, 
the insured, sued several insurers seeking indemnification for 
sums paid in settlement of its employees' claims of injury from 
exposure to toxic metals and chemicals in Gould's lead smelting 
facility.  One of the insurers, National Union, joined an 
additional insurer, Travelers, claiming entitlement for 
contribution.  Because Travelers had previously paid money to 
Gould in settlement of Gould's claims for indemnification, 
however, the trial court granted an order dismissing the cross- 
complaint against Travelers.  National Union appealed from that 
order. 
         The superior court affirmed.  The court held that, 
where two insurers are obligated to cover the same loss and one 
insurer settles but one does not, the litigating insurer cannot 
seek contribution from the settling insurer.  Id. at 19 
("Travelers is not 'contributorily' liable to National Union in 
this action.").  Rather, the litigating insurer "will be entitled 
to prorate the amount of coverage" based on the settling 
insurer's proportionate share of coverage responsibility as 
determined by the terms of the two policies, especially the 
"other insurance" provisions.  Id.  The court stated that the 
proration of a litigating insurer's liability will not be 
impaired by the dismissal of any settling insurers because "the 
applicable limits and pro rata shares pertaining to the policies 
issued by [the settling insurers] will be examined and their 
proportionate share of liability determined, even if they are no 
longer parties to the action."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted; alteration in original). 
         Had the Gould decision been issued by the supreme 
court, it would be controlling.  Absent some reason to believe 
that the supreme court would reach a different result, the 
superior court's holding is entitled to great deference in our 
endeavor to predict state law.  See, e.g., Rolick v. Collins Pine 
Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991) (predicting Pennsylvania 
law, and stating that we cannot disregard decision of 
intermediate appellate court unless we are convinced that  
state's highest court would establish different rule). 
         The superior court's decision in Gould, insofar as it 
requires the amount for which the litigating insurers are liable 
to be reduced by the settling insurers' apportioned shares, is in 
no way inconsistent with J.H. France, which involved no settling 
insurers.  Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had 
occasion to decide the effect of a plaintiff's settlement with 
fewer than all jointly and severally liable defendants outside of 
the environmental liability insurance context, and there the 
supreme court has adopted the apportioned share set-off rule, 
rejecting any right of contribution against settling defendants 
because such an action would defeat the finality of the 
settlement.  See Charles v. Giant Eagle Mkts., 522 A.2d 1, 2-3 
(Pa. 1987) (holding, in context of joint and several tort 
liability, verdict amount against litigating defendants shall be 
reduced by amount of settling defendants' apportioned share of 
liability, regardless of amount received by plaintiff in 
settlement).  The decisions in Charles and Gould are readily 
applicable in a case in all respects like J.H. France except for 
the existence of some settling insurers; there must be a set-off, 
rather than a subsequent contribution action, to avoid a double 
recovery. 
         We accordingly predict that, if presented with our 
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that each non- 
settling insurer whose policy was triggered to cover an 
indivisible loss is jointly and severally liable, up to the 
limits of its policy, for the full amount of the judgment, lessthe 
settling insurers' apportioned shares. 
 
                                3. 
         Having predicted how the supreme court would modify its 
holding in J.H. France to accommodate the problem of the settling 
insurers, we note that there are two additional rules of 
Pennsylvania insurance law that must guide our resolution of the 
case at hand.  These rules are relevant because, unlike J.H. 
France, this case involves excess as well as primary policies. 
         First, a true excess or secondary policy is not 
"triggered" or required to pay until the underlying primary 
coverage has been exhausted.  See, e.g., Occidental Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Brocious, 772 F.2d 47, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1985).  This remains 
true even where the primary insurer would have paid to exhaustion 
but for its bankruptcy: in Pennsylvania, an excess insurer is not 
required to "drop down" to provide primary coverage if the 
underlying primary insurer is insolvent.  See Donegal Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Long, 597 A.2d 1124, 1127-28 (Pa. 1991) (deciding to 
"refuse to transform an excess carrier into a primary carrier"); 
J. Kinderman & Sons, Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 857, 
860 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that excess policy is responsible 
only for amounts exceeding underlying policy's limits), aff'd, 
619 A.2d 1058 (Pa. 1993). 
         Second, if the underlying primary insurer is solvent 
but the policyholder settles its claim against that primary 
insurer for less than policy limits, we predict the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would adopt the widely-followed rule that the 
policyholder may recover on the excess policy for a proven loss 
to the extent it exceeds the primary policy's limits.  See Barry 
R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage 
Disputes § 13.04, at 575-77 (7th ed. 1994) (citing, inter alia, 
Stargatt v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D. 689, 691 (D. Del. 
1975) (opining that to require insured "actually to collect the 
full amount of the [primary] policies . . . in order to 'exhaust' 
that insurance . . . seems unnecessarily stringent"), aff'd, 578 
F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978)).  That is, settlement with the primary 
insurer functionally "exhausts" primary coverage and therefore 
triggers the excess policy -- though by settling the policyholder 
loses any right to coverage of the difference between the 
settlement amount and the primary policy's limits.  The excess 
insurer cannot be made liable for any part of this difference 
because the excess insurer never agreed to pay for losses below a 
specified floor (i.e., below the limits of the underlying primary 
policies).  Courts have adopted this rule because it encourages 
settlement and allows the insured to obtain the benefit of its 
bargain with the excess insurer, while at the same time 
preventing the insured from obtaining a double recovery. 
         Accordingly, because all of the London Insurers' 
policies provided layers of excess liability coverage over 
certain specified, underlying policy limits, no London Insurer 
policy would be triggered until the underlying coverage has been 
"exhausted," either by settlement or by payment.  With respect to 
this exhaustion requirement, the London Insurers argue that allapplicable 
primary coverage must be exhausted before any excess 
insurer will be obligated to pay.  This argument is predicated on 
the policies' "other insurance" clauses, which state essentially 
that all other available insurance must be exhausted first.  
Under J.H. France, however, a policy which promises to pay "all 
sums" must provide for full coverage once triggered, without 
regard for such "other insurance" clauses.  626 A.2d at 507.  The 
court held that it was irrelevant whether other policies were 
also triggered, concluding that, "The insurer in question must 
bear potential liability for the entire claim."  Id. at 508.  
Here, the London Insurers agreed to pay "all sums" in excess of 
the specified limits of the directly underlying policies.  Once 
the directly underlying coverage has been exhausted, then, each 
excess policy must indemnify the insured for the full excess loss 
up to policy limits.  Under J.H. France, the insured gets 
indemnified first (pursuant to the insuring agreements) and thenthe 
insurers may seek to redistribute the burden among 
themselves.  It is only at this latter stage that the "other 
insurance" clauses become relevant, so the London Insurers' 
exhaustion argument based on the "other insurance" clauses must 
be rejected.   
         In sum, taking all of the above rules together, we 
predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that the 
non-settling excess insurers are jointly and severally liable for 
the full amount of the loss in excess of:  the sum of (1) the 
policy limits of the directly underlying, "exhausted" primary 
policies, and (2) the combined pro rata shares of other settling 
(primary and excess) insurers.  The beneficent consequences of 
this formula are that the insured bears the risk of settling too 
low while the non-settling insurers bear the risk of being unable 
to redistribute equitably among themselves the burden of paying 
the balance (if, for example, some of their number are 
insolvent). 
 
                                4. 
         During the period litigated at trial in this case, 
1953-1960, there were two primary policies directly underlying 
the twelve excess policies issued by the London Insurers.  There 
were no other policies involved in that period.  Prior to trial, 
Koppers settled with the insurer that had issued both primary 
policies.  Accordingly, coverage under these two primary policies 
has been "exhausted" -- regardless of the amount Koppers received 
in settlement -- and the London Insurers' excess policies are 
obligated to pay. 
         If Koppers had not settled with any other insurers 
(insurers which had issued policies outside of the 1953-1960 
litigation period), that would be the end of the matter: the 
judgment would be reduced simply by the combined limits of the 
two underlying primary policies, and the London Insurers would be 
jointly and severally liable for the balance (although they would 
be free subsequently to seek contribution from the other  
insurers, all of whom would be non-settlers).  But our case is 
not so simple: Koppers settled with several other primary and 
excess insurers that had issued policies in effect both before 
and after the litigation period.  On remand, the district court 
must therefore apply the apportioned share set-off rule for these 
settled policies as well. 
         Determining the apportioned share of a settling insurer 
requires consideration of the "other insurance" clauses of the 
policies found to cover the loss and the applicable state law 
governing the interpretation of those clauses and the resolution 
of any conflicts among them.  See Gould, 585 A.2d at 19; see  
also Ostrager & Newman, supra, §§ 11.01-11.04 (discussing 
allocation of coverage responsibility and resolution of conflicts 
involving "other insurance" clauses).  The record before us does 
not contain the "other insurance" clauses from all potentially 
applicable policies.  Moreover, because of the district court's 
limitation of the period covered by the trial, all policies that 
may be found to cover the indivisible loss have not yet been 
identified.  In these circumstances, we cannot determine what the 
apportioned shares of the settling insurers will be.  While we 
leave that determination for the district court in the first 
instance, we offer two observations to assist the district court 
in its task. 
         Our first observation relates to the primary policies 
that do not directly underlie the London Insurers' excess 
policies (i.e., those that cover a period outside of 1953- 
1960).  We have today held that the London Insurers' liability 
under their excess policies was triggered as soon as the two 
directly underlying primary policies were settled, and that the 
existence of other primary policies applicable to the indivisible 
loss was irrelevant for the purpose of resolving the threshold 
issue of whether the London Insurers' policies were triggered.  
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the existence of 
other primary policies applicable to the indivisible loss is 
irrelevant for the purpose of determining the extent of the 
London Insurers' liability under their excess policies.  The 
"other insurance" clauses of the relevant policies and the 
Pennsylvania law applicable thereto may require that, as between 
a primary policy and an excess policy triggered to cover the same 
loss, the primary policy must pay first and, accordingly, that 
the apportioned share of a settled primary policy covering the 
same indivisible loss is its full policy limits.  See, e.g., 
Ostrager & Newman, supra, § 11.03[e][1].  Thus, the district 
court may be required to deduct from the total loss the combined 
limits of all settled primary policies.   
         Our second observation relates to the settled excess 
policies.  Koppers settled with some, but not all, of the excess 
insurers that issued policies in effect outside of the litigation 
period.  Therefore, there are some non-settled, excess policies 
for which the threshold triggering question has not been 
answered.   
         It may be that, under the applicable law, the 
apportioned share of a settling excess insurer -- and, 
accordingly, the extent of the London Insurers' liability -- 
cannot be determined without identifying all policies that are 
triggered and cover the indivisible loss, whether they were in 
force during or outside the litigation period.  This will be 
true, for example, if the applicable rule of allocation among 
excess policies here is found to be a pro rata allocation based 
on the limits of each policy and the total limits of all 
triggered policies.  See Gould, 585 A.2d at 19; Ostrager & 
Newman, supra, § 11.04.  Under this rule of allocation and the 
peculiar circumstances of our case, however, the district court 
would not need to determine whether the non-settling pre-1971 
policies were triggered because the London Insurers concede -- 
against their interests -- that all of Koppers' policies up to 
1971 (the date from which pollution exclusion clauses have 
appeared in all the policies) were triggered.  Reply Br. at 31 
(noting that Koppers "admits" this fact).  With respect to the 
post-1970 policies, however, the district court may have to 
decide whether those policies were triggered before it can 
properly determine the settling insurers' apportioned shares.   
                               IV. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
for the sole purpose of allowing the district court to mold the 
verdict to take account of the settling insurers' apportioned 
shares of liability. 
 
